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Operation ''Winter Storm'' ((ドイツ語:Unternehmen Wintergewitter)) was a German offensive in World War II in which the German 4th Panzer Army unsuccessfully attempted to break the Soviet encirclement of the German 6th Army during the Battle of Stalingrad. In late November 1942, the Red Army completed Operation Uranus, encircling some 300,000 Axis personnel in and around the city of Stalingrad. German forces within the Stalingrad pocket and directly outside were reorganized under Army Group Don, under the command of ''Generalfeldmarschall'' Erich von Manstein. Meanwhile, the Red Army continued to allocate as many resources as possible to the eventual launch of the planned Operation Saturn, which aimed to isolate Army Group A from the rest of the German Army. To remedy the situation, the ''Luftwaffe'' attempted to supply German forces in Stalingrad through an air bridge. When the ''Luftwaffe'' proved incapable of carrying out its mission and it became obvious that a successful breakout could occur only if launched as early as possible, Manstein decided on a relief effort. Originally, Manstein was promised four ''panzer'' divisions. Due to German reluctance to weaken certain sectors by redeploying German units, the task of opening a corridor to the German 6th Army fell to the 4th Panzer Army. The German force was pitted against several Soviet armies tasked with the destruction of the encircled German forces and their offensive around the lower Chir River. The German offensive caught the Red Army by surprise and made large gains on the first day. The spearhead forces enjoyed air support and were able to defeat counterattacks by Soviet troops. By 13 December, Soviet resistance slowed the German advance considerably. Although German forces took the area surrounding Verkhne-Kumskiy, the Red Army launched Operation Little Saturn on 16 December. Operation Little Saturn defeated the Italian 8th Army on Army Group Don's left flank, threatening the survival of Manstein's entire group of forces. As resistance and casualties increased, Manstein appealed to Hitler and to the commander of the German 6th Army, General Friedrich Paulus, to allow the 6th Army to break out of Stalingrad; both refused. The 4th Panzer Army continued its attempt to open a corridor to the 6th Army on 18–19 December, but was unable to do so without the aid of forces inside the Stalingrad pocket. Manstein was forced to call off the assault on 23 December and by Christmas Eve the 4th Panzer Army began to withdraw to its starting position. Due to the failure of the 6th Army to breakout and the attempt to break the Soviet encirclement, the Red Army was able to continue the destruction of German forces in Stalingrad. ==Background== On 23 November 1942, the Red Army closed its encirclement of Axis forces in Stalingrad.〔McCarthy & Syron (2002), p. 141〕 Nearly 300,000 German and Romanian soldiers, as well as Russian volunteers for the ''Wehrmacht'', were trapped in and around the city of Stalingrad〔Erickson (1983), p. 4〕 by roughly 1.1 million Soviet personnel.〔Glantz (1995), p. 134〕 Amidst the impending disaster, German chancellor Adolf Hitler appointed ''Generalfeldmarschall'' (Field Marshal) Erich von Manstein as commander of the newly created Army Group Don.〔Glantz (1995), pp. 134–136〕 Composed of the German 4th Panzer and 6th Armies, as well as the Third and Fourth Romanian Armies, Manstein's new army group was situated between German Army Groups A and B.〔Erickson (1983), p. 7〕 Instead of attempting an immediate breakout, German high command decided that the trapped forces would remain in Stalingrad in a bid to hold out.〔Erickson (1983), p. 3〕 The encircled German forces were to be resupplied by air, requiring roughly of supplies per day. However, the assembled fleet of 500 transport aircraft were insufficient for the task.〔Bell (2006), p. 62〕 Many of the aircraft were hardly serviceable in the rough Soviet winter; in early December, more German cargo planes were destroyed in accidents than by Soviet fighter aircraft.〔Bell (2006), pp. 62–63〕 The German 6th Army, for example, was getting less than 20% of its daily needs.〔Bell (2006), p. 63〕 Furthermore, the Germans were still threatened by Soviet forces which still held portions of the Volga River's west bank in Stalingrad.〔Erickson (1975), p. 472〕 Given the unexpected size of German forces closed off in Stalingrad,〔Glantz (1996), p. 118〕 on 23 November ''Stavka'' (Soviet Armed Forces High Command) decided to strengthen the outer encirclement preparing to destroy Axis forces in and around the city.〔Erickson (1975), p. 470〕 On 24 November, several Soviet formations began to entrench themselves to defend against possible German incursions originating from the West.〔Erickson (1975), pp. 470–471〕 The Soviets also reinforced the encircling forces in order to prevent a successful breakout operation by the German 6th Army and other Axis units.〔McCarthy & Syron (2002), p. 143〕 However, this tied down over ½ of the Red Army's strength in the area.〔Erickson (1983), p. 8〕 Planning for Operation Saturn began on 25 November,〔Erickson (1975), p. 471〕 aiming for the destruction of the Italian 8th Army and the severing of communications between German forces West of the Don River and forces operating in the Caucasus.〔Beevor (1998), pp. 292–293〕 Meanwhile, planning also began for Operation Ring, which aimed at reducing German forces in the Stalingrad pocket.〔Erickson (1983), p. 9〕 As Operation Uranus concluded, German forces inside the encirclement were too weak to attempt a breakout on their own. Half of their remaining armor, for example, had been lost during the defensive fighting, and there was a severe lack of fuel and ammunition for the surviving vehicles given that the ''Luftwaffe'' was not able to cope with the aerial resupply.〔McCarthy & Syron (2002), pp. 143–144〕 ''Feldmarschall'' von Manstein proposed a counterstrike to break the Soviet encirclement of Stalingrad, codenamed Operation Winter Storm (German: ''Wintergewitter'').〔Erickson (1983), pp. 7–8〕 Manstein believed that—due to the inability of the ''Luftwaffe'' to resupply the Axis in the Stalingrad pocket—it was becoming more important to relieve them "at the earliest possible date".〔von Manstein (1982), p. 318〕 On 28 November, Manstein sent Hitler a detailed report on Army Group Don's situation, including the strength of the German 6th Army and an assessment on the available ammunition for German artillery inside the city.〔von Mansten (1982), pp. 319–320〕 The dire strategic situation made Manstein doubtful on whether or not the relief operation could afford to wait to receive all units earmarked for the offensive.〔von Manstein (1982), p. 320〕 ''Stavka'' postponed Operation Saturn until 16 December, as Soviet forces struggled to clear German defenders from the lower Chir River. The Red Army's offensive in the area commenced on 30 November, involving around 50,000 soldiers, which forced Manstein to use the 48th Panzer Corps in an attempt to hold the area.〔Erickson (1983), p. 10〕 In response, the 5th Tank Army was reinforced by the newly created 5th Shock Army, drawn from existing formations of the South-Western and Stalingrad Fronts; the 5th Tank Army totaled nearly 71,000 men, 252 tanks and 814 artillery guns.〔Erickson (1983), pp. 10–11〕 The Soviet offensive succeeded in tying down the 48th Panzer Corps, originally chosen to lead one of the main attacks on the Soviet encirclement.〔McCarthy & Syron (2002), p. 144〕 The Soviets were forewarned of the impending German assault when they discovered the German 6th Panzer Division unloading at the town of Morozovsk and as a result held back several armies from the attack on the lower Chir River to prepare for a possible breakout attempt by German forces inside Stalingrad.〔Erickson (1983), p. 11〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Operation Winter Storm」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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